Please enter the search related information in the fields below. Partial information works, e.g. "SP-21
" in the "tdoc" field lists all TSG SA documents from 2021. Regular expressions mostly work in all fields (e.g. "2[34].501
" in the "Spec" field lists all documents related to 23.501 and 24.501. Capitalization is disregarded, i.e. "3GPP
" gives the same results as "3gpp
".
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tdoc | Title | Type / Revs | Source | Spec / CR | S/WID | Release | Meeting | Status | Links |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
S3-191907 | Key issue on protecting the SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA |
pCR revised to S3-192433 |
Qualcomm Incorporated | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
revised | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191908 | Using MACS to provide freshness for the protection of SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA |
pCR revised to S3-192921 |
Qualcomm Incorporated | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
not treated | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191927 | A key issue on forward secracy | pCR | Huawei, HiSilicon | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191928 | A solution to forward secracy | pCR | Huawei, HiSilicon | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191963 | Solution for anchor keys security | pCR | Gemalto N.V. | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191964 | Mitigation against linkability issue | pCR | Gemalto N.V. | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
not treated | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191975 | Structure RAND for authentication | pCR | ZTE Corporation | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
not treated | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191976 | Handling of Sync failure | pCR | ZTE Corporation | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
not treated | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191977 | Modification on linkability issue1 |
pCR revised to S3-192431 |
ZTE Corporation | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
revised | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191978 | Conclusion on linkability issues | pCR | ZTE Corporation | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
not treated | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191996 | Co-existence of LTKUP and PFS | discussion | Ericsson | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] | |
S3-191997 | New KI: Leakage of long-term key | pCR | Ericsson | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-191998 | New solution: EAP-AKA´ PFS | pCR | Ericsson | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-192066 | mitigate the linkability attack | pCR | Huawei, Hisilicon | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
not treated | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-192144 | New solution for the linkability attack | pCR | Huawei, Hisilicon | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
not treated | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-192147 | New KI: KAUSF storing at UE side | pCR | Huawei, Hisilicon | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-192185 | Updating UDM with UE registration status | pCR | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-192188 | Discussion paper UE initiated PFS | discussion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai bell |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] | |||
S3-192191 | pCR UE initiated PFS | pCR | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
noted | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-192431 | Modification on linkability issue1 |
pCR revision of S3-191977 |
ZTE Corporation | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
approved | [WTS] [JSN] |
S3-192432 | Draft TR 33.846 | draft TR | Ericsson | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
approved | [WTS] [JSN] | |
S3-192433 | Key issue on protecting the SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA |
pCR revision of S3-191907 |
Qualcomm Incorporated | 33.846 0.1.0 | FS_AUTH_ENH | Rel-16 |
S3-95 AI: 8.19 |
approved | [WTS] [JSN] |
22 documents (0.32311701774597 seconds)